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The purpose of this grant was to investigate the role that the psychology of intent and foresee-ability plays in people’s 
everyday psychological constructs of guilt and responsibility in child injury and infanticide cases, under the premises 
of Section 5, Domestic Violence, Crime, & Victims Act (2004). The case of Rebecca Lewis, who came to light and 
shocked the public because of her inaction, and thus guilt of familial homicide under Section 5, by allowing her baby 
son Aaron Gilbert to be killed by her partner’s abuse, prompted this large scale study. Familial Homicide, more 
commonly known as the ‘cause or allow’ offence is a relatively new offence in the United Kingdom (Section 5, 
Domestic Violence, Crime, & Victims Act 2004), in which both caregivers can be prosecuted for a child’s death even 
if one caused the death while the counterpart allowed it by not intervening. Rebecca Lewis’ inaction in this case was 
deemed to have allowed baby Aaron’s death, and thus by law she equally caused the outcome of her child’s death in 
conjunction with her abusive partner. This project identified that this law could be difficult for everyday jurors to 
consider, because psychologically ‘cause’ and ‘allow’ have different psychological meanings when the outcome is the 
same for both by law, even though the actions or the intention behind those actions are so divergent. For Rebecca 
Lewis there was no evidence of intent to harm, rather what she claimed to be a misplaced hope that her partner’s 
behaviour would improve.  
Three questionnaire-survey studies were designed to measure the public’s guilt, responsibility, and intuitive 
sentencing attributions using a quantitative-qualitative mixed method, to identify where individuals might diverge 
from legal prescriptions for scenarios in which a woman in Rebecca Lewis’ situation might be more or less 
psychologically culpable. The three studies demonstrated that the psychological reality of how people reason about 
intent behind actions or inactions, or ascribe an ability to foresee consequences from the woman’s perspective in the 
scenario, does not correspond neatly to the legal logic defined by the ‘cause or allow’ offence under Section 5.  
Overall the findings showed that a better understanding of how anticipating outcomes that could have reasonably 
been foreseen, could provide a critical intersection for examining responsibility, punishment, and appropriate 
balanced intervention or adjudication in child protection, in the context of the ‘cause or allow’ offence. The main 
findings of the grant are summarized here and the resulting E-Policy Report and grant outputs are highlighted at the 
end of this report. 
Study 1: Intentional Actions and Inactions: This study found that the presence or absence of intent in a legal 
scenario in a ‘cause or allow’ case predicted the extent of the public’s intuitive sentencing of the defendant when the 
defendant was the mother’s partner. Regardless of whether the mother acted or did not act, if he had intended to 
cause harm then he was sentenced more harshly. Moreover, intentional allowers of harm by inaction, or non-
intervention attempts are punished more when discovered, than allowers who have no intent to harm.  Study 2: 
Intentions and Concordant and Discordant Outcomes: Regardless of whether the outcome matched the defendant’s intent, 
that is, when the intent to cause a negative or harmful outcome in fact led to a negative outcome as opposed to a 
positive one, judgments of guilt and sentencing punishments were harsher. However, guilt and sentencing were 
found to not be necessarily psychologically the same. Defendants contributing to accidental injuries, whether positive 
or negative outcomes occur, are judged the least guilty in comparison to intentional and unintentional positive and 
negative outcomes in the absence of accidental contribution, but they are sentenced relatively harsher than when 
there is no intent or accidental contribution for positive outcomes. The defendant receiving the harshest judgments 
for guilt and sentencing, was the defendant that intended harm when in fact a positive outcome resulted. In other 
words, intent trumps outcome for guilt and sentencing, especially when thwarted.  Study 3: Witness Foresight and 
Reasonable Prevention: This study focused on the allower and her gender relative to a male causer, and how harshly 
people judged her in accordance with how much abuse she had witnessed, or how much foreknowledge she had 
relative to being aware of his propensity for abuse. In terms of finding her not guilty of causing, but guilty of 
allowing, participants opted for guilty of allowing, or doubt 79% of the time, and innocent 21% of the time. This 
finding was reasonably consistent across all conditions regardless of whether she had in fact eye-witnessed abuse or 
not, or whether she knew he had a prior conviction or not, or whether there was evidence against her at all. These 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338530 
results and an interdisciplinary discussion about foresight and the law are now available in the E-Policy Report 
‘Foresight and Reasonable Prevention in Child Protection Contexts: The public’s perspective’, Spring 2012. 
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